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INVIGORATING ‘NANOETHICS’: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING DELIBERATIONS IN TAIWAN 
AND BEYOND 
 
Shang-Yung Yen∗, Shawn H.E. Harmon∗ and Shu-Mei Tang∗ 
 
Cite as: 
5(3) NanoEthics 309-318. 
 
Abstract:  Nanotechnology is the new(est) star in the high technologies 
sky.  While nanotechnologies remain technologies of promise and 
potential, a growing number of nano-materials and nano-particle-reliant 
products are being produced.  And although a growing number of 
academic, policy and industry reports are exploring nanotechnologies, 
there are very few genuine ethical assessments of nanotechnologies as 
they exist and might evolve in the coming years.  Many questions have 
yet to be answered about the nature, development, and social and 
commercial deployment of nanotechnologies and what that means for 
the human condition and the preservation of our core values.  We argue 
that the early and potentially risky nature of this interdisciplinary science 
does not justify a blinkered focus on risk assessment and management to 
the detriment of deep and ranging ethical evaluations.  Much improved 
ethics evaluations must be undertaken, particularly in Taiwan where 
very little has happened despite grand expectations for, and funding of, 
the science.  In this paper, we uncover the development imperatives for 
nanotechnologies, demonstrate the paucity of genuine nanoethics 
exercises, outline key questions for stakeholders undertaking nanoethisc 
exercises to consider, and we articulate some preliminary actions for 
Taiwan (and other similarly situated jurisdictions) to take. 
 
Keywords: Ethics, Nanotechnologies, Risk, Uncertainty, Values, 
Taiwan 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Though predicted over 50 years ago [16], nano-scale science was not truly achieved 
until the invention of the scanning tunnelling microscope in 1981 [39], its use by IBM 
researchers to spell the initials ‘I.B.M.’ using 35 xenon atoms in 1990 [4], and the 
construction of a group of atoms capable of function in 2000 [36].  Still considered 
the new(est) star in the high technologies sky [claimed by 11, 48, 64], it is important 
to appreciate that there is no single, discipline-bounded ‘nanotechnology’; 
nanotechnologies are enabling technologies which draw on biotechnology, chemistry 
and biochemistry, engineering, physics, and physical/material sciences (and 
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combinations thereof).  They perform or are produced on an atomic, molecular or 
macromolecular scale (‘nanoscale’) so as to produce materials, devices, and systems 
with fundamentally new properties or functions resulting from their scale and which 
have practical applications in the real world.  Thus, nanomaterials are not smaller 
versions of their macroscale counterparts, they are materials with new and unique 
properties, exhibiting altered electronic, magnetic, mobility, mechanical, optical, 
reactive, solubility, or strength properties leading to new and novel effects [7].  
Although there are some nanomaterials being produced (eg: nanosilver, carbon 
fullerenes and nanotubes, etc.) and some nanoparticle-reliant products being sold (eg: 
clothes, sunscreens, etc.), nanoscience remains a science of potential with many 
questions yet to be answered about its nature, development, and social and 
commercial deployment [14].  Bearing this in mind, this paper, using Taiwan as a 
case study, considers the state of ethical assessments of nanotechnologies and 
highlights some core ethical issues and concerns.  In doing so, it offers some 
recommendations for the improvement of nanoethics in Taiwan, although many of the 
observations and recommendations are applicable beyond Taiwan. 
 
DEVELOPMENT IMPERATIVES IN TAIWAN 
 
It is important to stress at the outset that, although there are a growing number of 
academic, policy and industry reports exploring nanotechnologies, and addressing 
issues such as innovation and funding [5, 12, 28], and commercialisation [29, 32, 34], 
our understanding of the mechanisms, capabilities, and potential effects of 
nanotechnologies is in its infancy; nanotechnologies are more inspired dreams and 
hopes than material reality [13, 14].  Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, there is a strongly 
promissory atmosphere around nanotechnologies, with all manner of claims being 
made as to their social and commercial transformative potential [51].  This and other 
characteristics of the evolving field reflects Rip’s ‘promise requirement cycle’ [51], 
and Taiwan is a model example of that cycle in the nano-field.  Generally, ‘enactors’ 
(ie: protagonists trying to get the new technology to work, to generate value and 
wealth, and to enrol early adopters) articulate technological possibilities, signal 
opportunities, and promise possible future worlds, which, if accepted, result in the 
provision of resources and the fulfilment of additional requirements by others extant 
to the undertaking [50, 51], and this has undeniably happened in Taiwan with respect 
to nanotechnologies. 
Like many countries, Taiwan is encouraging networks which link nanoscience 
‘enactors’ so as to cultivate forward-looking innovation policies that will ‘ensure’ that 
research equipment is suitable, standards are in place, and lucrative international 
nanotechnologies collaborations are realised.  In Taiwan, very excited forecasting has 
prompted numerous funding and research programmes.  In 2002, the National Science 
Council (NSC) approved the National Science and Technology Programme for 
Nanoscience and Nanotechnology [40].  Designed to coordinate the efforts of various 
enactors, including the Ministries of Economic Affairs, Education, and Health, the 
Atomic Energy Council, Environmental Protection Administration, and Council of 
Labour Affairs, and to enhance interdisciplinary research, the Phase One (2003-2008) 
budget was set at approximately US$600 million.  The Phase Two (2009-2014) 
budget is US$726 million, and Wu Maw-kuen, the Programme Director, has 
emphasised that this second phase will target nano-electronic and opto-electronic 
technologies, nano-scale instruments, nanotechnologies for energy and environmental 
applications, and nano-scale biomedical research, as well as uses in potential and 
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traditional industries [40].  Taiwan’s National Research Council (NRC) has also 
launched a national nanotech research project, and numerous other projects have been 
initiated aimed at finding nano solutions in a variety of fields (eg: materials, 
electronics, machines and biotechnology) and across a range of industries (eg: the 
petrochemical, iron and steel, and other traditional industries). 
It is hoped – indeed anticipated – that nanotechnologies will be an ‘economic 
miracle’ that will encourage Taiwanese competitiveness and leadership worldwide.  
For example, Zheng Tianzuo, Director of the Nanocenter at Academia Sinica, stated 
that, despite existing personnel and budgetary shortfalls, nanoscience represents the 
road Taiwan must walk into the future, Xu Juemin, Manager of the Industry & 
Technology Intelligence Services (ITIS), referencing the unmitigated success of the 
semiconductor industry, claimed that Taiwan can repeat this miracle in nanoscience, 
and Huang Wenkui, ITIS Industrial Analyst, urged that Taiwan can take the initiative 
and realise great short-term commercial opportunities in nanoscience [65]. 
These hopes are encouraged by the economic predictions being made in 
relation to nanotechnologies worldwide.  For example, in 2000, the US National 
Science Foundation estimated that by 2015 US$1 trillion worth of products would 
contain nanotechnology [52].  In 2005, nanomaterial sales were reported as being 
US$30 billion with an expected 15% increase in worldwide manufacturing output by 
2014 [19].   One report estimates that in 2008, the EU invested some US$2.44 billion 
in R&D related to nanotechnology, the US some US$1.82 billion, Japan some 
US$1.12 billion, and Taiwan, ranked ninth in spending, invested some US$97 million 
[18].  Another report suggests that applying nanotechnologies to biotech products will 
have an enormous impact on society, with a market value reaching nearly US$300 
billion within the next 12 years [61].  A further report claims that industries utilising 
nanotechnologies could create 2 million jobs directly and three times that many in 
supporting activities [45]. 
Ultimately, as indicated, it is expected that Taiwanese investment in 
nanotechnologies will encourage economic growth and accelerate Taiwan’s 
development [61], and that, more than anything, seems to be the motivation for its 
course of action.  As is perhaps clear, the Taiwanese example maps quite neatly onto 
Rip’s thesis; the early stages of Taiwan’s involvement with nanotechnologies shows 
how the early promissory cycle has prompted speculation and concerns about future 
worlds, which has triggered further promises and (to some extent) concerns.  The only 
possible deviation is that agenda-building, rather than being diffuse, has been limited 
to enactor elites – a small number of actor elites.  Old, pre-war authoritarian power 
structures and methods have been retained as the model for Taiwanese policy 
formulation, and it remains a centralised and technocratic process whereby even 
consultations, which are not fully democratic affairs, are conducted largely by central 
policymaking authorities [9].  There remains an inability or unwillingness to carry out 
comprehensive and full-blooded policy and risk assessments where sensitive and 
contentious genetic technologies are involved.  By way of example, one might point 
to the processes that have led to the slow and controversial evolution of Taiwan 
Biobank.  The technocrat-led process was (and, to some extent, remains) a sheltered 
process wherein issues of risk and safety, public perception and trust, and social 
values and ethical impacts have been mostly ignored [9, 60].  It took an anonymous 
‘whistle-blower’ writing in the popular press to force the process into the open and the 
issues into the public debate [60, 68].  
The result of this has been that numerous civil society groups (including 
human rights, ethics, and science-and-technology-studies groups) have been 
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marginalised, and public understanding of science remains relatively poor.  With 
respect to the latter, a 2009 report from Taiwanese government indicates that nearly 
90% of respondents had never heard the term ‘nanotechnology’, and, when offered a 
brief description, 60% reported still not understanding it [42].  Of course, this poor 
public understanding of nanotechnologies is not limited to Taiwan.  A 2004 UK 
survey reported that only 29% of respondents admitted to being aware of 
nanotechnologies and only 19% could offer a definition [54].  A 2007 US survey, 
indicated that the public was generally unaware of nanotechnologies, with most 
respondents having heard little or nothing about them, and the majority being too 
uncertain to assess risks and benefits [26].  The same trend is discernable in other EU 
countries and elsewhere [10, 20, 56].  In any event, despite low levels of 
understanding in Taiwan, 60% of respondents in the aforementioned survey expressed 
concern about the potential risks, and 75% reported mistrusting the safety warranties 
of manufacturers.  Nonetheless, 80% of respondents felt that nanotechnologies bring 
(or would bring) benefits to the whole society, and agreed that developing them could 
bolster Taiwan’s ability to compete on the world stage, including in emerging areas 
such as medical treatments and environmental rehabilitation. 
These apparent contradictions are explained by the Taiwanese attitudes toward 
science and technology which are generally positive, optimistic, encouraging, and 
liberal [35].  The pursuit of science is highly respected, as are technology experts and 
their opinions.  This ‘sciencism’ – this national inclination to rely on science as a 
means of regeneration and competition with existing (and colonising) powers, and the 
concomitant elevation of science to a national imperative tangled up with nationalism 
– is common across various parts of East Asia [25, 57].  As a result of this sciencism, 
for example, the Taiwanese largely accept genetically modified food as safe because 
it has, on the one hand, been scientifically endorsed by some, and, on the other hand, 
has not clearly been demonstrated through solid scientific evidence to be dangerous to 
human health [35].  In short, this sciencism strongly bolsters acceptance of science 
and technology, making people less questioning of science elites, and it serves in 
some respects as a cultural counter-point to the precautionary approach (which is 
arguably dominant in Europe, at least in some technology settings). 
 
OVERLY NARROW ‘NANOETHICS’? 
 
Against this economic and development optimism and noise, and this almost purely 
enactor-dominated and bullish policy backdrop, genuine ethical assessments (ie: 
collaborative and investigative value- or principle-based assessments) have been 
muted [9].  If caution or reflexivity is exhibited at all in relation to nanotechnologies, 
they revolve around risks, particularly the risks posed by nanoparticles to the 
environment and human health [42].  Of course, the desire, and indeed the need, for 
risk assessments of uniquely interdisciplinary and therefore difficult-to-govern 
sciences is predictable, perhaps doubly so in the nanotechnologies setting given the 
nature of nanoparticles, which [27]: 
 
• have relatively high reactivity in relation to surface volume; 
 
• can deliver low dose toxicity that is more potent than their macro-scale 
counterparts; 
 
• can enter the human organism through inhalation, oral ingestion, dermal 
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penetration (and are increasingly likely to do so from multiple routes as nano-
particles accumulate in the environment); and 
 
• can more easily circulate to various sites within the human organism once 
penetrance is achieved. 
 
Clearly, material risks to health and the environment are extremely important issues, 
particularly given that research and production are proceeding apace [47], but they are 
not the only important issues, and the emphasis on risk to the abandonment of those 
other issues is to commit the three ‘common errors’ that are all too common in 
nanoethics, which are [13]: 
 
1. confusing ethics with prudence, understood as rational risk management 
exercises; 
 
2. limiting ethics analyses with consequentialist cost-benefit analyses (if the risk 
dialogue can be broken away from); and 
 
3. ethically critiquing the scientific technique itself, rather than the technology. 
 
In short, nanoethics is frequently collapsed into concerns with, and concepts of, risk 
(ie: the potential for negative health and environmental impacts as a result of 
nanotechnology deployment) [13 and others].  Certainly risk is a public concern: 
almost 60% of respondents in the 2009 survey expressed concern about the potential 
risks of dermal exposure to, or inhalation of, nanoparticles, the emphasis of which 
varied depending on whether one was a nanotech company employee (more 
concerned about dermal exposure) or a scientific expert (more concerned about 
inhalation) [42].  Even nanotech enactors warn that companies must be open about 
their pursuits and discussions, and must engage with risk [17, 66]. 
However, despite the obvious importance of risk, the ethical aspects of 
nanoscience (and its resultant technologies and products) are much broader, ranging 
from social, to political, to regulatory, many of which have socio-moral or ethical 
components, and many of which arise (or ought to arise) well before risk management 
stages are reached.  In Taiwan, although Article 8 of the Science and Technology Act 
emphasises the responsibility of the science sector, research institutions, and 
individual scientists to “properly fulfil” their obligations to safeguard not only the 
environment, but also respect for life, and humanitarian ethics, there is no ethics 
committee organised for nanoscience [41].  As such, the scope and quality of ethical 
consideration and evaluation is poor.  When debates beyond risk have been held, they 
have been about the economic promise of nanotechnologies, for, as has been noted 
elsewhere [9], the technocrat-dominated processes that do exist value economic 
development and favour economic benefits and innovation over other factors. 
Ultimately, and on the whole, there is a dearth of genuine ethical evaluations, 
not only in Taiwan (although certainly in Taiwan), but also around the world.  The 
above shows that ethical assessments (in Taiwan) are not robust; they focus almost 
entirely on technology promise and economic benefits, or, alternatively, the narrow 
issues of risk identification, the articulation of levels of risk aversion/acceptance, and 
the management of risks deemed appropriate.  Even these issues are not particularly 
well explored or managed in Taiwan.  As a result of this, there has arisen a general 
lack of public trust toward key enactors relating to governance of new and emerging 
 6 
technologies in Taiwan (as opposed to science elites themselves) [60, 68].  With 
respect to nanotechnologies specifically and public trust of key enactors, 75% of 
Taiwanese respondents reported not trusting the safety warranties of manufacturers 
and some 70% reported having little confidence in media reports about 
nanotechnologies [42]. 
 
A CALL FOR EXPANDED NANOETHICS ASSESSMENTS 
 
Like other emerging and powerful high technologies, nanotechnologies are 
transformative; they have the potential to transform common goods (eg: food, clothes, 
cosmetics and paint), specialist goods (eg: automobiles, communication and 
computational tools), health goods (eg: drugs, biochips, novel therapies), and society 
itself (eg: its modes of production, public institutions, means and nature of 
interactions).  With respect to the latter, although currently marginal and boundary-
pushing, nanotechnologies can and do generate uncertainty and division, and they 
may ultimately shift innovation and marketing paradigms, socio-legal systems and 
institutions, and social relationships [33, 44].  Additionally, it has (rightly) been 
argued that existing international capital structures have concentrated 
nanotechnologies and derivative wealth to certain countries, classes, and sectors, and 
that their driving force (as further suggested from the above) is little more than 
national competitiveness, which does nothing to ensure that benefits will be widely 
enjoyed (most existing nano-products are military or luxury goods), or that living 
conditions will be improved for the population more widely [18, 55]. 
Given the strong enactor push, the low levels of trust in enactors, and the 
(arguably) unique complexity, multidisciplinarity, and heterogeneity of 
nanotechnologies, a robust approach to the ethics of nanotechnologies – or rather to 
the collaborative human assessment of their individual, social and environmental 
consequences – is vitally important.  The first and ongoing responsibility of society, 
especially those involved in nanoethics, is to give serious consideration to a variety of 
sometimes uncomfortable questions about ourselves, our objectives, and our social 
trajectories.  In the past, this might have meant questioning human nature and locating 
the ethical technology assessment in the answer to that question.  For Kant and 
Roussseau, human nature was defined primarily by the ongoing search for perfection.  
Taking up this idea of “striving”, Atlan argues that humans attain their nature (ie: 
their humanity) when undertaking creative activity, for it is through creation that we 
may associate with God [3].  According to Arendt, a consensus on the content of 
human nature is unlikely in a modern, secularised society where our power over the 
world is increasing [2].  As such, the root question is perhaps better formulated as: 
What is the human condition? 
Adopting the position that our human condition is informed by what we know, 
what we’ve achieved, and what our dreams are for creation/science (regardless of 
whether we have the means to achieve that dream), Dupuy disregards references to 
the sacred as a means of identifying (moral) transgression, and argues that humanity 
must look within itself for guidance [13].  He claims that the primary role of ethics is 
not to determine what is good and bad, but rather what elements of the human 
condition we take for granted, how they are changing, and whether that change is 
acceptable.  In doing so, we must articulate, defend and impose our own norms.  
Dupuy concludes: 
 
The human subject will therefore need to have recourse to a 
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supplementary endowment of will and conscience in order to 
determine … what he ought to do … . (2000: 254) 
 
Given that nanotechnologies offer potentially vast powers to reproduce and 
manufacture nature and life, and given that they could permit humanity to remake 
itself and redefine its characteristics and limits, we have the responsibility to think 
very deeply about first order questions which implicate our core values.  Such 
questions include: 
 
• What are our core values? 
• How might we define those values at this time? 
• Why are they important? 
• What is human flourishing and human identity? 
 
Core values may include conceptions of solidarity, equality, autonomy, justice, 
sustainability, security, safety, health promotion, suffering relief, knowledge 
generation, and so on [for more on values, see 21, 22, 23].  While these will have to 
be defined and explored within particular cultural settings (and also within varying 
social groups within those diverse cultures), such culturally sensitive evaluations must 
take notice of rhetorical declarations and legal obligations in international instruments 
as well as emerging universal values and norms [24]. 
We have the additional responsibility to consider (arguably more instrumental) 
second order and third order ethical questions. Second order questions include: 
 
• What dreams and social forces are driving our nanotechnologies? 
• Are we developing and deploying those technologies justly? 
• How are and should these technologies socially embedding? 
• What does that embedding mean for people’s life chances? 
 
Third order questions, which are arguably somewhat more speculative, include 
questions about how nanotechnologies might: 
 
• promote or erode solidarity or social cohesion; 
• enable human agency and autonomy; 
• effect privacy and related rights to family life; 
• influence development and political activities; 
• inform or transform professional duties; and 
• interact or interfere with other core values. 
 
Of course, recognising some of the important observations on the pursuit of overly 
speculative ethical assessments [15, 31, 43, 67], we would caution against fixing our 
gaze too far into the future.  Rather, we recommend “exploratory ethics”, which links 
up and forms a part of a wider and inclusive discourse which sensitises actors to 
issues.  Inclusiveness is important because different actors have different roles.  For 
example, scientists and engineers determine (and push) technical potentialities and 
generate the final vision of a technology (by actually producing it), sociologists are 
sensitive to the relational consequences of technologies, ethicists and lawyers are 
concerned about exemplary cases and the development of enduring principles.  All 
need a seat at the table if the key values of democracy and transparency are to be 
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realised [8].  Such exploratory exercises might be techno-moral scenario based, but 
again, they must not rely on visions too far removed from present capabilities and 
trajectories and near-future objectives. 
As one might expect, while values are deeply held and slow to alter, they are 
socially constructed and therefore subject to (gradual) change, including as a result of 
forces external to us as individuals; developments in science are examples of change 
instigators, and, for many people, will be considered ‘external’ (even though science 
is, in many ways, created/shaped by all of us, often diffusely, on an ongoing basis).  
Additionally, the above recognises that technologies are contingent with no natural 
order, pace or direction of development; they are dependent on actors, networks, laws, 
inertia, and momentum [30].  Given the evolutionary nature of values and the 
contingency of technologies, we might argue that, so long as stakeholders (and the 
participating public) are active early and remain engaged, much is up for negotiation.  
Public questioning of the technological promises being made (and their social 
consequences), the potential for those promises, if realised, to actually rectify pressing 
(and anticipated) social needs, the availability of alternatives to address social 
issues/problems, the interaction of these technologies with cherished social values, 
and so on, could result in better technologies and deployments thereof.  
(Parenthetically, we note that different social groups have different levels of power 
(and access and ability to influence) in relation to shaping both technologies and 
values; technological outcomes reflect these inequalities and, in turn, exert pressure 
on social values in particular directions, all of which impact on levels of 
marginalisation and willingness to participate, but these are issues beyond the scope 
of this paper to address in detail.) 
While some of these questions have been noticed in the scholarship [58], they 
have not received sufficient attention, a fact which may stem from nanotechnologies 
being marginal and not perceived as substantially different in kind or substance from 
the other new technologies that they are enabling, which has resulted in emphases on 
risk which otherwise rather uncritically accepts both the science/technique and its 
resultant technologies.  This dearth of deep and compelling ethical analyses of the 
other important socio-ethical issues, including conflicts about justice, respect for 
persons, etc., must be reversed.  These and other issues relating to practices to which 
nanotechnologies might give rise must be explored through a variety of ethical 
approaches, including those based on virtue, consequence, deontology, and justice.  
And they must be visited and revisited. 
 
A DEMAND FOR TAIWANESE STAKEHOLDER ACTION 
 
Nanotechnologies are entering the Taiwanese market, including products in sensitive 
areas such as genomics (eg: microarray biochips are popular in many biotech 
companies).  As such, one might have hoped that some genuine and conspicuous 
ethical assessments of the technologies had been undertaken, but this is not the case.  
Taiwan has yet to think very deeply about the condition, direction, and realistic 
implications of nanotechnologies, either through elite enactors or more collectively 
through public engagement activities [69].  A continuing failure in this regard brings 
to mind images of Benjamin’s (1968: 257) [6] ‘angel of history’: 
 
This is how one pictures the angel of history.  His face is turned 
towards the past.  Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one 
single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and 
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hurls it in front of his feet.  The angel would like to stay, awaken the 
dead, and make whole what has been smashed.  But a storm is blowing 
from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that 
the angel can no longer use them.  This storm irresistibly propels him 
into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris 
before him grows skyward.  This storm is what we call progress. 
 
As this quote implies, there is a real danger – not only to the pursuit of nanoscience 
(and therefore to knowledge-generation and commerce), but to society and the 
environment – when science leaps too far ahead of ethical thinking, social discussion 
about its potential and consequences, and public governance.  Bearing this in mind, 
and recognising the impossibility of predicting all conceivable research outcomes and 
effects in this rapidity changing field, we recall Symonides’ plea for “biovigilance” in 
relation to GMOs [59], and call for “nanovigilance” in Taiwan and elsewhere. 
For Taiwanese stakeholders in particular, including the NSC, we recommend 
that immediate action be taken in relation to the following: 
 
• Public Education:  Drawing on the scientific and social data that is currently 
available, authorities should take the lead in educating people about the many 
promises and (known and suspected) risks of nanoscience and technologies, 
as well as about the scope of issues beyond this that deserve sober thought.  
Such simplifying and demystifying efforts (which should be more than mere 
risk communication) should rely on a variety of media. 
 
• Specialist Analysis:  Authorities should actively encourage and facilitate 
(through funding) specialist meetings and debate on the first, second and third 
level questions identified above, with a view to regularising critical ethical 
discussion in the nanotechnologies field.  To this end, a specialist 
interdisciplinary subcommittee within the NSC could conduct technology 
foresight and exploratory ethical evaluative exercises. 
 
• Public Engagement:  Beyond education and awareness-raising, authorities 
should facilitate interactive public debate and dialogue between lay and 
specialist communities [53].  A serious consideration of nanotechnologies 
must be undertaken by more than just ELSI experts; scientists, policymakers, 
and publics must play a participative role.  The above-mentioned NSC sub-
committee could also host interactive evaluative events. 
 
• Research Policy:  In cooperation with interested stakeholders, including 
industry and civil society groups, authorities should fashion socially and 
ethically sensitive research and development policies in the high technologies, 
including nanotechnologies.  In support of this, they should fund empirical 
studies on public and enactor attitudes, desires, and values and principles. 
 
All of these efforts combined will provide Taiwan with a much more socially and 
ethically grounded base from which to fashion its governance instruments and thereby 
shape the evolution of nanotechnologies (which we have every expectation will 
continue to proceed apace), and there are certainly stakeholders in Taiwan prepared to 
move on these if properly supported.  The science-and-technology-studies community 
in Taiwan together with certain members of the NSC are interested in a variety of 
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issues, including the relationships between innovations and society, and the directions 
and risks of science and technology, and they have increasingly called for improved 
governance processes and increasingly been willing to engage in forming same [62, 
63]. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Paradigm-shifting technologies are not new – the early machines of the industrial 
revolution shifted the relation of people to goods and labour, the factories of the mass-
production era shifted the relation of people to creativity, and the information and 
communication technologies of the computer era shifted the relation of people to 
services, commerce and each other.  Nanotechnologies are just the latest links in an 
ongoing chain of technologies that challenge how we interact with the world and 
develop artefacts.  However, as with many of the previous technologies, despite 
yawning gaps in our scientific understanding (ie: with respect to nanotechnologies, 
our comprehension of processes involving nano-particles is only rudimentary [1, 38, 
54]), so-called ethical assessments all too frequently start with risk assessments and 
end with (at least tentative) recommendations for risk governance measures (which 
inevitably fall short of a full-blooded adoption of the precautionary principle) [37, 46, 
49].  As enabling technologies, nanotechnologies implicate a wide spectrum of actors, 
who must be marshalled, motivated, regulated, and realigned if the science is ever to 
achieve its (promised) potential.  The beginning of good governance in this diffuse 
area is an understanding of the human condition and a forming of inclusive 
communities of these same actors to consider the ethical, legal and social aspects of 
nanotechnologies.  We are not so naïve as to think that the development of 
nanotechnologies can be stopped (nor are we advocating this), but their development 
can be influenced if actors are well informed and actions are well timed and placed.  
A robust approach to nanoethics will facilitate that, for, ultimately, ethical 
assessments are about preparing people for change (acclimating them to new 
realities).  As a scientific leader in this field, it behoves Taiwan to also be a socio-
ethical leader. 
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